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SHOULD THE LEFT HAND 









To the extent that the Supreme Court of Canada’s docket is a reliable 
indicator of the issues most vexing the country, one thing is clear: many 
Canadians feel the government knows just too damn much about us. Cases 
concerning what may be generally characterized as “informational privacy” 
abound,1 with those who have felt the gaze of government’s prying eyes 
invoking a wide variety of Charter2 and non-Charter means to try to stop the 
unwanted attention. 
The Supreme Court’s 2002 decisions make it evident that many Canadians 
feel not only that Big Brother knows too much, but also that he can’t keep a 
                                                                                                                                                              
  Of the Ontario Bar. The views expressed are those of the author and not of the federal De-
partment of Justice.  
1
  Apart from the cases to be discussed in this paper, the list of notable cases includes: Dagg 
v. Canada (Minister of Finance), [1997] 2 S.C.R. 403; R. v. Mills, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668; R. v. Arp, 
[1998] 3 S.C.R. 339. 
2
  Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982 being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “the Charter”]. 
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secret. The focus of this paper is on three criminal cases — R. v. Law,3 Quebec 
(Attorney General) v. Laroche,4 R. v. Jarvis5 — and one civil — Smith v. 
Canada (Attorney General)6 — in which significant issues were raised about 
the extent to which the passing of personal information from one arm of the 
government to another attracts Charter scrutiny. 
These cases are not the first criminal cases in which the Supreme Court has 
looked at the issue of government information sharing. Previous cases have 
examined provision of electrical consumption records by a hydro utility to the 
police,7 provision of blood samples by a coroner to the police,8 provision of 
drugs seized by a high school principal to the police,9 and provision of youth 
court dockets by Provincial Court staff to school boards.10 The application of 
previously articulated principles to new contexts in 2002 did not, however, 
substantially improve the clarity of the law. 
That we should have so many Supreme Court cases in the general area in 
such a short time is propitious. South of the border, a congressional inquiry into 
the 9/11 disasters has identified problems in governmental information sharing 
as a contributory factor in the government’s failing to prevent the terrorist 
strikes.11 The American government’s legislative response was swift and 
aggressive and included the enactment of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 
that rolls a large number of government agencies into a massive Department of 
Homeland Security to facilitate, inter alia, information exchange.12 There has 
also been discussion of a controversial initiative called “Total Information 
Access” in which the government would have access to colossal amounts of 
publicly and privately held information.13 
                                                                                                                                                              
3
  2002 SCC 10. 
4
  2002 SCC 72. 
5
  2002 SCC 73. The principles set out in Jarvis were applied in the companion case of R. v. 
Ling, 2002 SCC 74. 
6
  [2001] 3 S.C.R. 902. A companion case, Re Privacy Act (Canada), [2001] 3 S.C.R. 905 
considered a non-Charter challenge to the same information sharing problem.  
7
  R. v. Plant, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 281. 
8
  R. v. Colarusso, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 20. 
9
  R. v. M. (M.R.), [1998] 3 S.C.R. 393. 
10
  Re F. (N.), [2000] 1 S.C.R. 880. 
11
  Final Report of the Intelligence Joint Inquiry into the Terrorist Attacks of September 
11, 2001 (http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/findings.pdf (accessed June 11, 2003). 
12
  The Act may be found on the Department of Homeland Security’s website at 
http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/ (accessed June 11, 2003), along with access to numerous speeches by 
President George W. Bush and Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge on the importance of the 
Department’s information sharing mandate. 
13
  See, e.g., Levy, “Why Civil Libertarians are Uneasy,” Washington Times, Dec. 12, 2002 
(www.washingtontimes.com), article ID 200212120823280016 (accessed June 11, 2003); “A 
Snooper’s Dream,” New York Times, November 18, 2002, Section A, p. 18 (www.nytimes.com). 
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Information sharing is an important constitutional issue not only for the 
“privacy versus security” debate. Most individuals probably would not be 
aware of the existence or extent of governmental information sharing had the 
issue not come to light due to recent litigation. Since government should be 
striving to abide by constitutional norms, even if its activities aren’t 
conspicuous to the general public, it needs to know what those norms are. As 
alluded to above, the contention here is that the present state of the law presents 
difficulties in sorting out the applicable norms. 
II. THE SECTION 8 BACKGROUND: PLANT AND COLARUSSO 
To understand the significance of the 2002 information-sharing cases, some 
background is necessary. The leading cases on the subject in the section 8 
Charter context are the Court’s 1993 decision in R. v. Plant,14 and the 1994 
decision in R. v. Colarusso.15  
R. v. Plant concerned a section 8 challenge to the validity of a search warrant 
executed on a residence where marihuana was being grown. Plant attacked the 
warrant on the basis that the grounds supporting its issuance had been obtained 
unconstitutionally. One impugned ground was the obtaining of Plant’s 
electricity consumption records by the Calgary police from the City of 
Calgary’s utilities commission. The police obtained the records by computer, 
their access facilitated by a utility-provided password. 
The Court held that the transfer of information between the utility and police 
did not infringe section 8, based on a balancing of state and individual interests. 
The following passage sets out the Court’s approach: 
Consideration of such factors as the nature of the information itself, the nature of 
the relationship between the party releasing the information and the party claiming 
its confidentiality, the place where the information was obtained, the manner in 
which it was obtained, and the seriousness of the crime being investigated, allow 
for a balancing of the societal interests in protecting individual dignity, integrity 
and autonomy with effective law enforcement.16 
Applying that test, the Court concluded, largely on the basis that the 
information was part of a commercial relationship and was not of a personal 
and confidential nature, that no reasonable expectation of privacy had been 
infringed. In that regard, the Court made the following comments: 
                                                                                                                                                              
14
  Supra, note 7. 
15
  Supra, note 8. 
16
  Supra, note 7, at 293. 
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In fostering the underlying values of dignity, integrity and autonomy, it is fitting 
that section 8 of the Charter should seek to protect a biographical core of personal 
information which individuals in a free and democratic society would wish to 
maintain and control from dissemination to the state. This would include 
information which tends to reveal intimate details of the lifestyle and personal 
choices of the individual.17 
R. v. Colarusso was decided four months after Plant, and contained no 
reference to it.18 In Colarusso, hospital staff obtained blood and urine samples 
from Colarusso following two automobile accidents involving the vehicle he 
drove, the second of which resulted in the death of another driver. The samples 
were obtained pursuant to a standard hospital trauma protocol. Colarusso was 
found to have consented to use of the samples for medical purposes.19 The 
samples were then obtained from the hospital by the coroner pursuant to the 
Ontario Coroners Act20 for an investigation into the cause of the driver’s death. 
The coroner submitted them for analysis, and the analyst subsequently testified 
at Colarusso’s criminal trial for criminal negligence causing death (among 
other charges). 
The Court split, 5:4, as to whether the use of the samples in the criminal 
prosecution infringed section 8. The majority, per La Forest J., concluded that 
the state’s appropriation of the results of the analysis constituted an 
unreasonable seizure21 — either because the acquisition of the samples by the 
police without warrant was itself unreasonable, or because the police action had 
the effect of rendering the coroner’s seizure unreasonable. The minority (Lamer 
C.J., Cory, McLachlin and Major JJs.) jointly concluded there was no police 
seizure and thus no section 8 breach. 
What is important about the majority approach in Colarusso is that it tends 
to obviate the need for a Plant-type contextual balancing of state and individual 
interests. Once the purpose of the state appropriation of some information shifts 
from a non-criminal investigation purpose to criminal investigation, the Hunter 
v. Southam Inc.22 criteria apply, and a warrant is required unless the state can 
                                                                                                                                                              
17
  Id., at 293. 
18
  Oral argument in Colarusso took place four months after oral argument in Plant, so the 
cases were under reserve together for six months before Plant was handed down. 
19
  Supra, note 8, at 49. 
20
  Coroners Act, R.S.O. c. 93, s. 16(2)(a). 
21
  Note that there was no evidence of a physical seizure of the samples or the analyst’s test 
results by the police; the majority was willing to bridge the evidentiary shortfall by terming the 
analyst’s evidence an “appropriation”, relying heavily on the fact that the analyst in question was 
frequently used by the police. Inferentially then, the analyst transferred the information to the police 
such that the state would have been justified in laying the charges and subpoenaing the analyst at 
trial. 
22
  [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145. 
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demonstrate exigent circumstances. The initial, consensual seizure for medical 
(treatment) purposes did not infringe section 8 and neither did the subsequent 
seizure for Coroner’s Act (investigation of death) purposes. The shifting of the 
state’s purpose to criminal investigation was regarded as so fundamental that it 
altered the nature of the relationship between the individual and the state. 
III. THE 2002 INFORMATION SHARING CASES 
To trace the development of the law in 2002, the cases will be examined 
chronologically. Before looking at the criminal cases, it is of some value to 
broaden the parameters slightly to consider briefly a civil case decided in 
December 2001. 
1. Smith v. Canada (Attorney General)23 
Ms. Smith was a recipient of unemployment insurance benefits in 1995. She 
was absent from Canada on vacation for a two-week period during January and 
February. Upon returning to Canada by air, she filled out the required E-311 
card for Customs which noted the duration of her trip. Unbeknownst to her, 
Canada Customs and the Unemployment Insurance Commission had entered a 
formal agreement pursuant to the Customs Act24 and Treasury Board policy to 
permit the sharing of information. The Commission queried the fact that she 
had indicated in her claimant report card that she was available for work during 
the period of absence; benefits were denied for the period and she appealed. A 
Board of Referees dismissed her appeal in respect of the denial of benefits. 
On further appeal, Rothstein J., sitting as Umpire, rejected the claim that the 
sharing of information between arms of the government infringed her section 8 
rights.25 Justice Rothstein considered the issue at considerable length, applying 
the criteria set out in R. v. Plant as the template for his analysis, and concluded 
that: 
… the appellant and other Canadian residents … cannot be said to have held a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in relation to their E-311 information disclosed to 
the Commission, which outweighs the government’s interest in enforcing the laws 
disentitling unemployment insurance claimants from receiving benefits while 
outside of Canada.26 
                                                                                                                                                              
23
  Supra, note 6. 
24
  R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (2nd Supp.). 
25
  CUB 44824 (May 27, 1999) http://www.ei-ae.gc.ca/easyk/search.asp (accessed June 11, 
2003). 
26
  CUB 44824, at para. 136. 
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Justice Rothstein did not deal extensively with the difference between 
Customs’ use of the E-311 information and the Commission’s use. He did note 
that the Customs Act conferred discretion on the minister to disclose 
information, and that the sharing agreement between Customs and the 
Commission limited the type of information shared, the use to which it could be 
put and prohibited further disclosure by the Commission to third parties.27 He 
also found that the sharing, because it was authorized by the Customs Act, was 
authorized by section 8(2)(b) of the Privacy Act.28 
Justice Rothstein’s judgment was upheld in very brief reasons by the Federal 
Court of Appeal and in a single paragraph judgment by the Supreme Court. 
Both courts accepted that the R. v. Plant test applied in the circumstances. 
Reference to R. v. Colarusso is entirely absent from the three decisions. 
2. R. v. Law 
At issue in R. v. Law29 was the use, in a prosecution for GST evasion, of 
photocopied documents obtained by Revenue Canada investigators from police 
officers. The documents, which appeared to be in “Chinese characters,” were 
found in a safe recovered in a field by the police after Law had reported that the 
safe had been stolen in a break and enter of his restaurant. The documents at 
issue were of no interest to the officer (White) conducting the theft 
investigation; a second officer (Desroches), who had harboured “gut feelings” 
about tax improprieties by the restaurateur, took them and passed copies on to 
tax authorities. 
The Court held, 9:0, that Desroches’ actions of examining and photocopying 
the documents constituted a search and, absent a warrant, were unreasonable. 
The analysis of Bastarache J. is a straightforward application of the majority 
judgment in Colarusso. The police had lawful custody of the documents for the 
purpose of the theft investigation. Once the purpose shifted to an unrelated 
investigation, a warrant was required because Desroches “lacked specific 
authority to examine and photocopy the contents of the appellants’ safe.”30 
The chain of reasoning employed by Bastarache J. is somewhat opaque. 
Corporal Desroches’ conduct is impugned because he “lacked specific 
authority.” How his authority differed from Constable White’s is not explained, 
because White’s authority is not described. Presumably, White’s authority was 
some or all of: the implied consent of the victim of crime to assist the police in 
                                                                                                                                                              
27
  CUB 44824, at para. 59. 
28
  R.S.C. 1985, c. P-21. 
29
  2002 SCC 10. 
30
  Id., at para. 24. 
(2003), 20 S.C.L.R. (2d) Should the Left Hand Get What 203 
 the Right Hand’s Got? 
 
Job name: SCLR vol 20   CRA             Date:Tuesday, March 06, 2012 
solving that crime;31 a general statutory duty to investigate;32 and a common 
law duty to investigate.33 Desroches clearly had no consent from the victim, but 
whether other sources of authority, such as a common law duty to investigate, 
might outweigh the absence of consent in other situations, appears to be left 
open by Bastarache J. He discusses the possibility of the police being “lawfully 
positioned” to make a seizure pursuant to statute or common law authority;34 he 
goes on to say that he makes no comment on situations where photocopying 
might be “reasonably necessary to investigate their theft or carry out a 
legitimate law enforcement objective.”35 “Legitimate,” presumably, means 
according to some lawful authority. 
Identifying the source of the authority of actions is significant because of the 
importance the Court placed on the shifting of the purpose of the investigation. 
What we should take from this case is the importance of characterizing and 
comparing the objectives of the state actors engaged in the information sharing. 
If it were fair to characterize the objective of both White and Desroches as 
“investigation of crime,” there may have been no Charter breach, since there 
would be no shifting of purpose. In Law, the Supreme Court obviously rejected 
such a broad-brush approach. 
3. Quebec (Attorney General) v. Laroche36 
Laroche and his auto repair business were audited by an employee of the 
Société de l’assurance automobile du Québec (SAAQ), which regulates garages 
engaged in automobile reconstruction work. In the course of the audit, the 
employee discovered paperwork indicating that the same auto parts had 
apparently been used to rebuild five different vehicles. The SAAQ employee 
passed this information to the police, who obtained search warrants. The 
warrants were subsequently quashed by Grenier J. of the Québec Superior 
Court, in part because the passing of the information from the regulator to the 
police ran afoul of a principle said to arise from R. v. Colarusso: that 
information collected in the course of an administrative investigation cannot be 
disclosed to the police for a criminal investigation.37 
The Supreme Court rejected the reviewing judge’s broad interpretation of 
Colarusso. Possibly because Laroche’s counsel did not defend this part of 
                                                                                                                                                              
31
  See also D.P.P. v. Morrison, [2003] EWHC 683, at para. 20.  
32
  See, e.g., Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. R-10, s. 18. 
33
  See R. v. Godoy, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 311. 
34
  Supra, note 29, at para. 25. 
35
  Supra, note 29, at para. 26. 
36
  2002 SCC 72. 
37
  Id., at para. 83. 
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Grenier J.’s analysis,38 the court devoted little attention to the issue. For the 
majority, LeBel J. suggested that the information was: (i) provided in 
compliance with legislated obligations; (ii) was not therefore “private in 
relation to government”; and (iii) that the transmittal of the information was 
connected to the performance of the SAAQ employee’s duties.39 Chief Justice 
McLachlin, who dissented in part but concurred with LeBel J. on this point, 
noted that because section 504 of the Criminal Code40 permits bodies like the 
SAAQ to swear criminal informations, they can report crime to the police.41 
As in Law, the result may seem intuitively correct but the reasoning is less 
than clear. Both the third factor mentioned by LeBel J. (transmittal of the 
information being a duty), and the factor mentioned by McLachlin C.J. (the 
right of both the SAAQ and the police to lay charges) suggest that the transfer 
of information involved no shifting of purpose. However, the first two factors 
raised by LeBel J., relating to the statutory obligation to produce, have not been 
treated by the Court as being determinative; indeed statutorily-compelled 
production of information has given rise to extensive Charter litigation.42 
4. R. v. Jarvis 
The latest, and most comprehensive, of the Court’s decisions occurred in the 
context of a prosecution for tax evasion. The primary issue in R. v. Jarvis43 
pertained to the distinction between the Canada Customs and Revenue 
Agency’s (CCRA’s) audit and investigation functions under the Income Tax 
Act.44 Was it appropriate for the Special Investigations Section, charged with 
pursuing evasion cases, to use information gathered by the Business Audit 
section for civil assessment purposes? 
The salient facts of the case were that the CCRA received a tip that Jarvis 
had failed to report income from the sale of his late wife’s art works in his 1990 
and 1991 tax returns. The Business Audit section followed up on the leads 
primarily through use of its statutory powers to compel production of 
                                                                                                                                                              
38
  In para. 98 of his factum in the S.C.C. (file 28417), Laroche’s counsel stated:  
… les intimés concèdent que la base factuelle pour établir la collusion entre 
l’organisme administartif et les forces policières est insuffisante. Par conséquent, les intimés 
concèdent que cette portion du jugement dont appel devrait etre révisée sur cette base. 
 In essence, the point was conceded because of an absence of evidence of collusion be-
tween the SAAQ and the police. 
39
  Id., at para. 84. 
40
  R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
41
  Supra, note 36, at para. 6. 
42
  See, e.g., R. v. Fitzpatrick, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 154; R. v. White, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 417. 
43
  2002 SCC 73. 
44
  R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.). 
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information under sections 231.1 and 231.2 of the Income Tax Act. The auditor 
determined that there were significant amounts of unreported income. At trial, 
the judge held that at a certain point in the audit, the auditor’s “predominant 
purpose” shifted from auditing to criminal investigation. In the challenge to the 
validity of a search warrant conducted by Special Investigations, the trial judge 
concluded that he had to excise from the Information to Obtain the Warrant any 
information acquired following the shift in focus from civil audit to criminal 
investigation. Without the excised material, the warrant had to be quashed. The 
trial judge also excluded any evidence gathered by Special Investigations 
through use of the section 231.1 and section 231.2 powers on the basis that 
those tools could not be used after the focus shifted to furthering a criminal 
investigation. On subsequent appeals to the Court of Queen’s Bench and the 
Alberta Court of Appeal it was held that the warrant was valid as the trial judge 
had erred by excising too much material from the search warrant information 
by misidentifying the point at which the purpose shifted. A new trial was 
ordered. 
The Supreme Court settled a controversy that had raged in lower courts for 
several years by deciding unanimously that an audit ceases to be an audit at the 
point the “predominant purpose” becomes establishment of penal liability.45 
Information gathered by auditors before that point using sections 231.1 and 
231.2 may be used by investigators to mount a case for prosecution. The 
investigators themselves may only rely on the search warrant powers of the Act 
to compel production of evidence. In the result, the order for a new trial was 
affirmed. 
In coming to these conclusions, the Supreme Court, extensively analyzed 
jurisprudence under both sections 7 and 8 of the Charter. The analysis it 
adopted, the judgment stresses, was “contextual.”46 A balancing of state and 
individual interests was undertaken, à la Plant, with specific reference to the 
Plant test on “the protection afforded by s. 8 with respect to informational 
privacy.”47 A seven factor “totality of the circumstances” test was articulated to 
assess when the individual/state relationship was sufficiently adversarial to 
require full Charter protections: 
(a) Did the authorities have reasonable grounds to lay charges? Does it appear 
from the record that a decision to proceed with a criminal investigation 
could have been made? 
                                                                                                                                                              
45
 The Court rejected a number of competing tests developed by lower courts in coming to 
this result: see supra, note 43, at paras. 85-87.  
46
  Id., at paras. 63-64. 
47
  Id., at para. 70. 
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(b) Was the general conduct of the authorities such that it was consistent with 
the pursuit of a criminal investigation? 
(c) Had the auditor transferred his or her files and materials to the 
investigators? 
(d) Was the conduct of the auditor such that he or she was effectively acting as 
an agent for the investigators? 
(e) Does it appear that the investigators intended to use the auditor as their 
agent in the collection of evidence? 
(f) Is the evidence sought relevant to taxpayer liability generally? Or, as is the 
case with evidence as to the taxpayer’s mens rea, is the evidence relevant 
only to the taxpayer’s penal liability? 
(g) Are there any other circumstances or factors that can lead the trial judge to 
the conclusion that the compliance audit had in reality become a criminal 
investigation?48 
The balancing analysis employed by the Court in Jarvis adds a new layer of 
complexity to the case law since the balance is struck with reference to section 
7 of the Charter, not section 8. Discussion of section 7 is notably absent from 
several other information sharing cases, despite the fact that a considerable line 
of cases has developed considering the acquisition of information by statutory 
compulsion and its use for prosecution purposes.49 That line of cases has 
produced its own multi-factor balancing test for determining admissibility of 
compelled production of information, the factors being: the existence of 
coercion, the existence of an adversarial relationship between the individual 
and the state at the time production of information was compelled, whether the 
dangers of unreliable confessions are present and whether use of the 
information would encourage abusive state conduct.50 
IV. THE WAY AHEAD AFTER JARVIS 
Supreme Court decisions on the acquisition, use and distribution of personal 
information have produced a variety of tests to deal with a variety of contexts. 
Perhaps this is not surprising, given the Supreme Court’s affection for both 
“contextual” Charter analysis and multi-factor, or balancing, tests. 
                                                                                                                                                              
48
  Id., at para. 94. 
49
  In addition to R. v. Fitzpatrick and R. v. White, referred to supra, note 42, these authorities 
include most importantly Thomson Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada (Director of Investigation and 
Research, Restrictive Trade Practices Commission), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 425. See R. v. White for a 
more comprehensive list. 
50
  R. v. White, supra, note 42, at para. 51. 
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With respect to information sharing, however, the jurisprudence has reached 
the point at which it is challenging to ascertain just what test is applicable in 
determining whether there has been a Charter violation: is it the balancing of 
interests approach characteristic of Plant and White? The bright line “shifting 
purpose” test of Colarusso? Or, the bright-line-in-multi-factor-clothing 
approach of Jarvis? It is not just the uninitiated who may be driven to despair in 
attempting to characterize issues for the purpose of determining which of the 
foregoing authorities apply. 
It is possible of course, that the various tests are simply variations on a 
unified approach that identifies different factors as being determinative in 
different contexts. One of the difficulties with multi-factor balancing tests is 
that while the Supreme Court usually emphasizes that the list of factors is non-
exhaustive (as it did in Jarvis, for example), lower courts are not likely to stray 
from the enumerated ones. The danger is that slavish adherence to the list will 
refocus the inquiry away from what the Court has mandated: a balancing of 
state and individual interests. 
How this plays out is evident in Smith,51 which sought to apply the Plant test 
in a non-criminal context. The Plant test makes reference to only one factor, 
“seriousness of the crime,”52 which is clearly a government concern, but which 
is relevant only to the extent that Ms. Smith’s actions could have given rise to a 
prosecution rather than a civil reassessment. The relative unimportance of this 
factor should not end the inquiry as to what the relevant government interests 
are.53 
Courts have to be vigilant to recognize how context drives the enumeration 
of factors. In a much different context, an American appellate court54 arrived at 
a different list, which might be seen as an alternative articulation of the Plant 
test: 
Thus, as in most other areas of the law, we must engage in the delicate task of 
weighing competing interests. The factors which should be considered in deciding 
whether an intrusion into an individual’s privacy is justified are the type of record 
requested, the information it does or might contain, the potential for harm in any 
subsequent nonconsensual disclosure, the injury from disclosure to the relationship 
in which the record was generated, the adequacy of safeguards to prevent 
                                                                                                                                                              
51
  [2001] 3 S.C.R. 902. 
52
  [1993], 3 S.C.R. 281, at 293. 
53
  See, e.g., Schreiber v. Canada (Attorney General), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 841, at para. 21, where 
Lamer C.J. (concurring) substituted another factor for “seriousness of the crime.” 
54
  U.S. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570 (3d Circ., 1980). The case considered the 
attempt by an American administrative agency to subpoena medical records of Westinghouse 
employees to conduct an occupational health and safety investigation. For another application of 
the test, see: In re Search Warrant (Sealed), 810 F.2d 67 (3rd Cir., 1987). 
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unauthorized disclosure, the degree of need for access, and whether there is an 
express statutory mandate, articulated public policy, or other recognizable public 
interest militating toward access.55 
The point here is not that the foregoing test is any better or worse than the 
Plant test, though one measure of a test’s general utility might be how readily 
adaptable it is to different contexts. The point is rather that if “context” and 
“balance” are the crucial concerns, applying a list of factors enumerated in a 
different context might corrupt the balancing process. 
We are probably some way away from an approach that aims to be more 
comprehensive. The Plant test, for example, identifies the importance of the 
nature of the relationship between the individual and the government 
information collector; Colarusso appears to be much more focused on the 
nature of the relationship between the government collector of the information 
and the government user — does it transform the relationship between 
individual and the state such that a Charter breach occurs? 
It is the exploration of the relationship between the collector and the user in 
which there is a lot of heavy lifting still to do. Laroche appears to suggest that 
no Charter breach will occur when the information is obtained pursuant to 
lawful authority, and both government entities are pursuing identical, or nearly 
identical objects. Commonality of object would not appear to be mandatory 
pursuant to the Smith analysis of Rothstein J. as long as the transfer of 
information accords with lawful authority and appropriate conditions are placed 
on subsequent use. 
Characterization of the objects of the state actors can also form a contentious 
part of the analysis, as a recent U.S. Supreme Court case, Ferguson v. 
Charleston,56 demonstrates. In that case, urine samples of pregnant women 
were obtained by a state-run hospital to determine the presence of narcotics, 
particularly cocaine. Positive results were shared with the police according to a 
detailed protocol. The majority of the U.S. Supreme Court (per Stevens J.) 
found the arrangement to be a violation of the American Fourth Amendment 
not because of any shifting of purpose in the transfer of the information, but 
because the initial acquisition of the sample was considered to be for the 
immediate purpose of gathering evidence (and hence a warrantless search), and 
not for the ultimate purpose of weaning pregnant women from narcotics 
addiction. The “immediate/ ultimate” purpose distinction was criticized both in 
the concurring judgment of Kennedy J. and in the dissent of Scalia J.  
Just what constitutes lawful authority for transfer of information is a very 
difficult issue. Is specific legislative authorization required and if so, how 
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  Id., at 578. 
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  No. 99-936 (March 21, 2001). 
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specific must it be? Can authority recognized at common law suffice? 
Furthermore, assuming there is either type of legal authority, what impact does 
that have on the Charter analysis? Assuming the legal authority permits sharing 
between one government agency and criminal investigators without judicial 
authorization, does the legal authority have to be constitutionally challenged in 
order to impugn the use of the information by investigators, or is it simply 
subject to a balancing of interests approach?  
In the federal sphere, information sharing is affected by a web of statute 
law57 and policy.58 Common law authority is also important, since in a variety 
of contexts, courts have been willing to recognize police power to take certain 
investigative measures that constitute interferences with an individual’s liberty 
or property.59 The extent of police common law authority is, however, fraught 
with uncertainty. The relationship between police duties and their authority to 
carry them out has been described in the following way by the Ontario Court of 
Appeal: 
The law imposes general duties on the police but it provides them with only limited 
powers to perform those duties. Police duties and their authority to act in the 
performance of those duties are not co-extensive. Police conduct is not rendered 
lawful merely because it assisted in the performance of the duties assigned to the 
police. Where conduct interferes with liberty or freedom of the individual, that 
conduct will be lawful only if it is authorized by law. That law may be a specific 
statutory power or it may be the common law.60 
The common law authority that permits police to take necessary 
investigative steps will obviously not apply in every situation in which the issue 
is the legal capacity of the government holder of the information to transfer the 
information to the police. Whether other common law authority (for example, 
an argument that the sharing of information was necessary to allow the holder 
of the information to carry out its duties), or a source of authority such as the 
prerogative,61 would constitute a separate and sufficient authority, remains to be 
litigated. 
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  See, e.g., the Privacy Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-21, s. 8, the Customs Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 
(2nd Supp.), s. 107, and the Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.), s. 241. 
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  See, e.g., the Treasury Board Policy on the Management of Government Information, 
http://publiservice.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pubs_pol/ciopubs/TB_GIH/mgih-grdg_e.asp. 
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  See, e.g., R. v. Waterfield, [1963] 3 All E.R. 659 (C.C.A.); R. v. Dedman, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 
2; R. v. Simpson (1993), 79 C.C.C. (3d) 482 (Ont. C.A.); D.P.P. v. Morrison; R. v. Mann, 2002 
MBCA 121 (under appeal to S.C.C.). 
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  R. v. Simpson, id., at 493. 
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  This would depend on how broadly the prerogative was construed. The Ontario Court of 
Appeal has recently suggested that the present scope of the prerogative may be narrow: see Black v. 
Canada (Prime Minister) (2001), 54 O.R. (3d) 215, at para. 27. Compare, however, Harris, “The 
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The current body of case law is inadequate in exploring the likely effects of 
any decision limiting information sharing on future government action. First, 
since many of these situations concern police acquisition of information needed 
to assemble the grounds necessary to obtain search warrants, limiting access to 
government-held information comes with a potential cost. If the police need 
prior judicial authorization to access information needed to obtain a warrant, 
they could find themselves in the trap of effectively needing one warrant to get 
another, and having insufficient grounds for either. 
Even more important, perhaps, is the potential impact of this case law on the 
use of prosecution as a tool, as highlighted by the Court’s approach in Jarvis. 
Non-payment of taxes, like false claims for unemployment insurance or other 
government benefits fraud, is conduct that can be dealt with by the state either 
by civil sanctions or criminal sanctions. Ideally, criminal sanctions should be 
reserved for the most serious defalcations. From the government’s perspective, 
that discretionary decision is best made once all the information is in. Decisions 
such as Jarvis, however, encourage or perhaps require the state to make that 
decision earlier in the information-gathering process. It does this by making 
CCRA constantly assess its purpose; once it feels that an audit has progressed 
to the point that a court may find it could have referred the matter for 
prosecution, it may well do so immediately rather than risk having 
subsequently obtained information found inadmissible if the case is referred 
later. The institutional momentum may thus be tilted inexorably towards 
prosecution. 
The focus in Jarvis, Colarusso and other cases on identification of a criminal 
investigation purpose behind state action is problematic. The difference 
between conduct which warrants civil sanction rather than criminal, or a 
Criminal Code prosecution rather than one under a regulatory statute, may 
often be a difference in degree, not kind.62 The Court is forced to treat it as a 
difference in kind, however, so as not to undermine the warrant requirement of 
Hunter v. Southam Inc.,63 which is treated as bedrock section 8 law. Colarusso 
might be seen as a strong reaffirmation of the Hunter presumption against non-
warranted takings; Plant prefers that each situation be subject to balancing. 
While the enunciation of a multi-factor test may often be a signal that the 
Court considers the law in a particular area to be resolved, we are far from the 
end of the road on the refinement of the law in this area. Even an approach as 
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the author argues that prerogative power permits government to do that which is not specifically 
precluded by law. 
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  R. v. D’Amour (2002), 166 C.C.C. (3d) 477, at 497 (Ont. C.A.). 
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  [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145. 
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detailed and flexible as that in Jarvis may be inapplicable in a different context, 
as the Court itself acknowledged.64 The proliferation of tests and the strength of 
the competing interests ensure a litigious future. 
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  R. v. Jarvis, [2002] S.C.C. No. 73, at para. 94. 
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